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This paper examines the effects of our modern media environment on affective 
polarization. We conduct a computer-based experiment during the last month of the 2012 
presidential election using the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE) to vary both the 
choice of media sources available about the candidates, and the tone of political advertisements 
presented to subjects. We posit that voters in a high-choice, ideologically-diverse media 
environment will exhibit greater affective polarization than those in a “mainstream” ideologically 
neutral environment. We also hypothesize that subjects who are exposed to negative rather than 
positive political ads will show increased affective polarization. We find that the combination of a 
high-choice ideologically diverse media environment and exposure to negative political ads, 
significantly increases affective polarization. We also find that both overall information search and 
selective exposure to information are influenced by our experimental manipulations, with the 
greatest amount of search, and the most biased search, conducted by Romney supporters in the 
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While there is much evidence that American politics at the elite level has polarized over the 
last several decades (Jacobson, 2005; Jones, 2010; Poole and Rosenthal, 2001; Stonecash, Brewer, 
and Mariani, 2003; Theriault and Rohde, 2011), the nature and extent of polarization at the mass 
level is less clear. Some scholars have found that voters are also becoming more ideologically 
polarized, while others claim that Americans are still much more moderate than their leaders (see, 
for example: DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2005, vs. 
Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998; Jacobson, 2005). However, another facet of polarization at the 
mass level—affective polarization—is now a well-documented phenomenon. That is, more and 
more partisans are beginning to view members of the other party as a disliked out-group and are 
displaying signs of inter-group hostility (e.g. Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2015; 
Westwood and Iyengar 2014).  
Some observers have suggested that the changing nature of the media environment may be 
contributing to this type of polarization (e.g. Iyengar, et al 2012), but there is little direct evidence 
for this proposition.  In this paper we examine the effects of the contemporary media environment 
on the affective polarization of American voters. Specifically, we experimentally test whether two 
factors influenced how partisans during the 2012 presidential elections felt about the two major 
party candidates running for office: the extent to which ideological diversity was available in the 
information subjects could access during the experiment, and the tone of the information that was 
presented in a series of campaign advertisements. Our analysis examines how the availability of 
diverse, strongly ideological news alternatives, like those found in our modern high-choice media 
environment, as well as exposure to negative advertisements presented by the candidates, 
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influence both selective exposure in information search and affective polarization in a presidential 
campaign. 
We have consciously chosen to study the degree of discretionary choice in information 
search among the mass public, and explicit attempts at manipulation by political elites, because 
they are key features of the modern media environment. The rapid growth of the number and 
diversity of media choices available to the public has only redoubled efforts by political elites to 
influence voters -- see, for example, the explosion in the amount of money spent on political 
advertising over the past decade (West, 1992, 2013). Previous research has considered both 
selective exposure and advertising tone individually as possible causes of polarization, but not the 
two in combination, and in the real world, of course, they occur together. Therefore, we analyze 
the effects of these two facets of the modern media environment in tandem, and find that the 
combination of the modern high-choice media environment and exposure to negative political ads 
significantly increases affective polarization among subjects. 
Affective Polarization 
 
     When most political scientists talk about political polarization, they are referring to the 
diverging ideologies of party elites, and thus talk about policy stands. At the mass level, there is 
some controversy about whether the political attitudes of the general public have similarly 
polarized (Fiorina and Abrams 2009). Some argue that voters are indeed becoming more polarized 
on policy stances, citing a decline in the number of people who identify as “moderates,” an 
increase in the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans, and the fact that the 
public has “sorted” themselves into more ideologically homogenous parties (Abramowitz and 
Saunders, 1998, 2008; Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2014; Ura and Ellis, 2012; Jacobson 2000; 
Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Campbell 2008). Others contend that the public is still 
 
 5 
fundamentally centrist and has not expressed more extreme views on policy issues over time 
(DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2005). 
 Relying on social identification theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), however, Iyengar, et al 
(2012) argue that a much better indicator of mass polarization is the extent to which partisans view 
each other as disliked out-groups. Iyengar, et al make the case that inter-party affect is a more 
appropriate measure of mass polarization than policy preferences or ideology, given the repeated 
findings of many scholars that partisanship is not based on ideology, but rather identity and 
psychological attachment (e.g. Lane 1959; Converse 1964; Sears and Funk 1999; Jennings, Stoker 
and Bowers 2009; Mason 2015). Indeed, while feeling thermometer evaluations by Democrats and 
Republicans of their own party have not changed at all from 1976 through 2008, evaluations of the 
other party have declined by 12 points over this period. This argument is further bolstered by the 
fact that rates of other attitudes and behaviors that suggest affective polarization (also referred to as 
social polarization; Mason 2015) such as intergroup bias, partisan activism, and anger at the 
outgroup’s presidential candidate, have increased markedly (Levendusky 2009; Abramowitz 
2010; Mason 2013; Mason 2015). Iyengar and Westwood (2014) even find that hostility toward 
one’s opposing party functions much like automatic prejudices based on race, and that affective 
polarization can influence behaviors and judgments in non-political situations, leading to bias and 
outright discrimination. 
 Many of these recent findings also suggest that affective polarization is not necessarily 
driven by increased polarization in policy preferences. While evidence of increases in affective 
polarization has been mounting, by most accounts, there have been only relatively small increases 
in polarization in attitudes on most issues (e.g. Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams and 
Pope 2015; Fiorina and Levendusky 2009; Mason 2013). As Mason (2015) suggests, voters may in 
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fact agree on far more than they realize because of the hostility between the two parties.  
 If ideological polarization is not driving affective polarization, then what is? It is this 
question that we seek to answer. Iyengar, et al (2012) suggest that exposure to intense, and often 
negative, campaign environments is at least one contributing factor that leads to a dislike of 
out-party members. Building on this finding, we seek to determine what aspects of the 
media/campaign environment, precisely, lead to affective polarization.   
***** Insert Figure 1 about here ***** 
 Figure 1 presents data on two related indicators of affective polarization tied directly to 
candidate evaluations: the absolute differences in feeling thermometer evaluations of the 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates from 1980 through 2012, and the percent of 
voters who said they strongly preferred their chosen candidate (as opposed to not very strongly 
preferring him). These two indicators bounce around a bit without much overall change from 1980 
to 1996, but then take off and increase 15 points over the next 16 years. This dramatic change is 
consistent with our argument that media diversity and choice, which dramatically increased over 
the same period with the rise of the Internet, has something to do with growing levels of affective 
polarization. We use the absolute differences in feeling thermometer scores and the percent of 
voters who express a strong preference for their chosen candidate as key indicators of in our study 
of affective polarization during the 2012 presidential election. 
Media Environment and Discretionary Information Search 
 
Before 1980 or so, in what Prior (2007) calls the “Broadcast News Era,” most television 
viewers had very few viewing options—essentially the three major network channels, which 
followed the same basic menu. Hence, viewers who watched TV in the early evening were likely 
to see the national news whether they sought out information or not. ABC, CBS, and NBC all 
 
 7 
mostly covered the same stories, from a balanced mainstream perspective. Newspapers and radio 
shared the same news agenda as TV did. This arguably contributed to relatively moderate, 
homogenized public opinion (Prior 2007). While it is a mistake to think of the public during this 
era as merely passive recipients of whatever messages media and political elites chose to air, it was 
far more difficult several decades ago to avoid the news, or to seek out additional, or more 
partisan, political information beyond what was provided by the mainstream sources.  
This all began to change with the spread of cable television in the 1980s and the explosion 
of new technology and new viewing options that followed, particularly after access to the Internet 
became widespread. Now people could watch sports or gardening or game shows or old movies or 
news 24 hours a day, which fostered two different types of selective exposure. First, people 
interested in politics and the national news could follow it more closely than ever before, but at the 
same time people with little or no interest in politics could now pretty easily choose to avoid it. Not 
only were there more options available, but technological changes made it simple for people to 
switch between them, as remote control devices were in 90 percent of American homes by 1990 
(Benson-Allott, 2014).1 This has led to what some scholars have called an increasing “knowledge 
gap” between those who are interested in politics and have some political information, and those 
who do not (Prior, 20075).   
Second, with more and more cable stations dividing the television audience into smaller 
and smaller shares, it became economically feasible for cable news stations to aim for specific 
ideological niches (Stroud, 2011). The Internet has increased choice and ideological diversity 
                                                 
1Although the remote control was invented in 1955, for example, it was considered an expensive 
luxury device for several more decades. In 1979 only 17 percent of U.S. households with 
televisions had a remote control (Benson-Allott, 2014). To switch to another program, most 
people had to get up off the couch, walk over to the television set, and manually change 
channels. Although we have no direct evidence on this point, we feel safe in asserting that people 
were much less likely to change channels in the Broadcast News era than they are today. 
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exponentially, while making access to information (for example, on the history of the remote 
control) dramatically easier. All of this has made a second type of selective exposure possible, 
allowing partisans to actively construct a one-sided media environment where they are primarily 
exposed to messages they already agree with (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008; Dilliplane 2011; Jerit 
and Barabas, 2012; Mutz, 2006; Stroud, 2008, 2010; but see Garrett, 2009 for some contrary 
evidence).   
It is this second type of selective exposure that many observers fear is contributing to the 
polarization of politics in America. The logic is simple, and harkens back to cognitive dissonance 
theory and post-decisional regret (Brehm, 1956; Festinger, 1957), and motivated reasoning 
(Kunda 1987, 1990; Lodge and Taber 2000; Redlawsk 2002).  Once people have made a 
decision – I am going to buy a brand X toaster – the last thing they want to learn is that brand Y 
produces better toast. Learning such information could cause cognitive dissonance, an unpleasant 
internal state, and to prevent it people will, if possible, selectively and purposefully avoid any 
information that might suggest that brand Y is better than my brand X. Instead, they seek out 
information that confirms the correctness of their original choice.2  
In politics, the important decision we make is which candidate we are going to support in 
the upcoming election, and much evidence suggests that voters are motivated reasoners in the 
same way that consumers of toasters or any other consumer product are. According to motivated 
reasoning, candidate evaluations are made “on-line,” such that evaluations update as new 
                                                 
2The experimental evidence for selective exposure is, in fact, quite mixed (Sears and Freedman, 
1967), but the theory is clear. There are, of course, other motivations besides dissonance 
avoidance that can guide information search, and would push viewers in the opposite direction. 
For example, Valentino et al (2009) and Pierce (2014) provide evidence that partisans who 
believe they will have to justify their candidate preference seek out information from the less 




information is learned over the course of a campaign (Kunda 1987, 1990; Lodge and Taber 2000; 
Redlawsk 2002). However, the process of learning is affectively charged, meaning that 
information that reinforces existing affect is easily assimilated, but information that runs counter 
to one’s feelings is often ignored or discounted (Redlawsk 2002). Selective exposure, then, can 
be thought of as a motivated reasoner’s attempt to maintain his or her existing affective state 
related to the vote decision. 
 In the Broadcast News era, there was little payoff from selective exposure even if it 
were possible, since most of the news took a balanced, centrist perspective. In contrast, in 
today’s ideologically diverse media environment, it is much easier to control the partisan nature 
of the information individuals receive, and thus the potential reward of selective exposure is 
much greater than it once was. If partisans, given the opportunity, choose to selectively expose 
themselves to an ideologically-compatible one-sided media environment, and they are influenced 
by it, then it is not very hard to see increased polarization in the masses as a likely outcome (see 
Coe et al (2008); Iyengar and Hahn (2009); Iyengar, Krosnick, and Hahn (2008); Jerit and 
Barabas (2012); and Levendusky (2013). See Prior, 2013, for a recent and mostly skeptical 
review).  
Clearly, both affective polarization and discretionary media choice have increased over 
the past three decades. This certainly does not mean that there must be a causal relationship 
between the two, but the causal chain of Increased Media Diversity and Choice  Greater 
Selective Exposure  More Affective Polarization is a plausible one, and could help explain the 
increase in affective polarization over time. 
Campaign Advertising and Nondiscretionary Exposure 
 
But just because we now live in a high-choice media environment, and individuals are 
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able to customize their information search, this does not mean people can completely avoid 
political messages, particularly if well-funded elites want the messages to be heard. For those 
living in a battleground state during a presidential election, for instance, it is nigh on to 
impossible to avoid at least some nondiscretionary haphazard exposure to political ads. And even 
if the depth of processing of such incidental exposure to a message is considerably less than it 
would be for some article a person had actively chosen to read, still most people, if they see an 
ad, will get the basic gist of the message the advertiser is trying to convey.  
The primary distinction that people who study political advertising make is whether a 
message is positive or negative – that is, whether it talks about a candidate’s own policies and 
qualifications for office, or criticizes an opponent’s policies and qualifications for office (Lau et 
al, 1999). We do not have very good data on the actual prevalence of attack ads and other types 
of campaign negativism before 1996 or so (Goldstein and Freedman, 2000, 2002, though see 
Geer 2006), but the popular press, political scientists, and communications scholars all noticed 
them in the late 1980s (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Jamieson, 1992; Kaid and 
Johnston, 1991; West, 1993), and research on the topic has exploded since then (Lau, Sigelman, 
and Brown, 2007; Mattes and Redlawsk 2014). Its alleged growth has certainly coincided with 
the growing affective polarization in American politics.  
There is also good reason to think that exposure to negative ads, as opposed to positive 
ads, could increase affective polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012), and we expect this 
effect to hold when in-party and/or out-party candidates “go negative.” First, partisans are 
probably more likely to react positively to any communications from their own candidate, thanks 
to positive feelings they likely have toward their own in-group. We suspect, then, that they 
would be likely to perceive and believe any attacks on the opponent from a trusted in-group 
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messenger (Lau, 1985). Second, partisans are probably more likely to reject or disbelieve attacks 
on their own candidate from the opponent due to motivated reasoning and disconfirmation bias. 
These seemingly unfair and inaccurate attacks on one’s in-party candidate will likely then lead to 
more negative affect directed toward the out-party candidate (an already suspect out-group 
member). Again, the causal chain of Increased Campaign Negativism  Likely Exposure to 
Negative Ads  More Affective Polarization is a plausible one for explaining the growth of 
affective polarization, at least for people living in states with highly competitive election 
campaigns. 
Further, it is possible that the combination of a negative campaign environment and a 
high-choice, ideologically-diverse media environment is what actually drives affective 
polarization. Partisans who are exposed to negative ads may be motivated to seek out more 
information, generally, than those who only see positive ads. This may be either because they 
wish to find information that refutes the negative information in the ads and coincides with the 
positive affect they have for their candidate (as motivated reasoning theories would suggest), or 
because negative information about one’s candidate could lead to anxiety, which, according to 
Affective Intelligence Theory (Marcus, Neumann and Mackuen 2000), would lead to increased 
information gathering. Subjects who have the option of selective exposure in this instance may 
well come away from their information search with only ideologically one-side information, and 
therefore a greater dislike of their opponent, and thus increased affective polarization. In this 
case, the causal chain would be: Increased Campaign Negativism AND Increased Media 
Diversity/Choice  Likely Exposure to Negative Ads, Greater Information Gathering and 





The primary dependent variables collected in this study involve 1) discretionary 
information search (the number of articles examined in two treatment conditions where subjects 
have the opportunity to examine a variety of news articles about Obama and Romney), 2) 
selective exposure (seeking disproportionately more information about a preferred candidate), 
and 3) affective polarization (liking a preferred candidate more than the opponent). In general, 
we expect the high-choice, ideologically diverse media condition to maximize all of these 
dependent variables. Information available in that condition might prove to many subjects to be 
more interesting and/or more trustworthy, and motivated reasoners should find the messages 
easier to control in the diverse media environment.  
Similarly, exposure to two negative ads rather than two positive ads is also expected to 
increase each of these dependent variables. As Geer (2006) argues, there is usually little to 
dispute about a positive ad. All candidates love the country, their families, and so on. But when a 
candidate criticizes an opponent, people want to see the supporting evidence (and/or possibly 
experience anxiety about their choice of candidate), and that could motivate subjects to seek out 
additional news stories to confirm or disconfirm the claims made by candidates in their attacks 
on their opponent. And if exposure to a negative ad from the opponent is more likely to bias 
information search in favor of their own candidate, it is also likely to increase affective 
polarization. However, it will be easier for partisans to find that supporting evidence in a diverse 
media environment. Therefore the combination of the diverse media environment and exposure 
to negative advertisements from the two candidates – that is, their interaction -- should maximize 
all of the measured dependent variables.  
Further, this could be particularly true of conservative Romney supporters since there are 
some suggestions in the literature that Republicans and conservatives are particularly trusting of 
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conservative media (and particularly distrusting of liberal media -- see for example Eveland and 
Shah, 2003; Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Lee, 2005). Thus we also look for pre-election Candidate 
Preference by Media Environment and Ad Tone interactions. 
Method 
 
This project was designed to examine the potential influence of media environment 
diversity and advertising tone on affective polarization. Because we are interested in drawing 
causal inferences, we utilize experimental methods. At the same time, we are interested in 
maximizing our external validity, so we chose to conduct our experiment at the end of the 2012 
presidential election, asking subjects to learn about and evaluate the actual candidates for 
president.3 Critics of classic control group/treatment group forced exposure media experiments 
(e.g., Arceneaux and Johnson, 2013; Bennet and Iyengar, 2008; Gaines and Kuklinski, 2011; 
Geer, Lau, and Nickerson, 2013; Hovland, 1959; Levendusky, 2013) argue that any observed 
effects in these kinds of studies are often most likely concentrated among subjects who would 
not otherwise typically see the ad or news program, which seriously challenges the external 
validity or generality of those findings. This design presents a “tough case” for our hypotheses, 
then, as most Americans (including our subjects) were already familiar with the candidates in the 
race and likely had formed some opinion of them well before participating in our experiment. 
Any effects on subjects of our manipulations over and above their already-established attitudes 
and preferences would provide very strong evidence that media environment can and does 
influence affective polarization, particularly in battleground states where a diverse media 
environment is often combined with exposure to negative ads. 
                                                 
3Readers who would like to see the experiment can go to  
http://dpte.polisci.uiowa.edu/dpte/action/player/launch/471?test=1 &pass=Election2012 





We recruited a convenience sample of 489 subjects, all of whom came from one of two 
different sources, a telephone survey focusing on the presidential election being conducted from 
late September through mid-October 2012 by the Center for Public Interest Polling at the 
Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University; and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
Survey respondents were asked about their attention to the campaign, their stands on prominent 
political issues, their perceptions of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, and so on. Towards the 
end of the pre-election interview all subjects were informed that they could also participate in an 
online study about the election if they have an email address. Respondents were told that the 
study would take no more than 15 minutes, and would include a chance of winning an iPad if 
they agreed to participate. Ultimately 147 of the respondents from our telephone poll participated 
in the experiment we are describing here. While the original phone survey was a nationally 
representative sample, clearly these volunteers are not. 
This study was also posted on MTurk in mid-October as the survey was completing, 
offering $2 for a 15 minute pre-election study with a promise of another $2 to answer four 
questions after the election.4 Another 363 subjects from MTurk completed the study, for a total 
of 510 persons. Of those, we have complete data from 489 subjects.5 All analyses reported 
                                                 
4We attempted to contact all subjects again after the election to record their actual vote choice. 
The very brief post-election portion of the study only asked subjects if they had voted, and if so 
which candidate they had supported. We obtained post-election data from 256 or 52% of the 
people who completed the pre-election portion of the study. As we do not examine those data in 
this paper, however, we make no further mention of them. 
 
5Eleven people began the study but quit before they completed it, and we could not use their 
data. Ten other people missed one of the two “trap” questions that were included to make sure 
subjects were paying attention, and we eliminated their data as well. Inclusion of these latter 
subjects does not substantively alter the results reported herein. See Kleinberg et al (2014) for a 
more thorough discussion of using MTurk subjects in fairly complex, time-consuming 
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below include a dummy variable distinguishing between volunteers from our initial phone survey 
and the MTurkers, but in general there were no noticeable differences between our two sources 
of data.  
Our subject pool in part reflects some disproportionate liberal Democratic bias of MTurk 
workers (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012) although the sample is not dramatically 
different in partisan identification from Gallup’s immediate post-election numbers. For the 
analyses reported in this paper, the data have been weighted to achieve a better balance on race 
and pre-election candidate preference, although we certainly do not offer our findings as 
representative of the American public. Subject representativeness does not affect the causal 
inferences we can draw from the random manipulations in our experiment, of course, and the 
unweighted data provide essentially the same results as those presented in this paper (data 
available from the authors). 
Subjects were 53 percent female, with an average of 15 years of education, 41 years of 
age, with annual income around $63,000. Seventy-seven percent of our subjects were white, 9 
percent African American, and 9 percent Hispanic. Just over a third of the subjects were 
Protestant, 19 percent Catholic, and 32 percent nonreligious. Thirty-six percent were Democrats, 
27 percent Republicans, and 36 percent independents. Thirty-nine percent were very liberal or 
liberal, compared to 36 percent who were very conservative or conservative. Forty-eight percent 
expressed a pre-election preference for Barack Obama, while 37 percent said they intended to 
vote for Mitt Romney.6 
Design and Procedure  
                                                                                                                                                             
experiments. 





Subjects participated in a 3x2 experimental design in which we varied both Ad Tone 
(positive or negative) and Media Environment (a neutral “Broadcast News” era condition, an 
ideologically diverse “Modern Media” condition, and a “control” condition that provided no 
additional information7).  
After reading an online informed consent page, MTurk subjects answered 20 questions 
about their general political beliefs, and provided basic demographic background information 
about themselves; questions that telephone survey respondents had answered as part of the 
telephone poll. Subjects then answered questions about how much they thought they knew 
(relative to most other citizens) about the policy stands and personal qualities of Barack Obama 
and Mitt Romney. These four questions were combined into a scale of Subjective Knowledge 
about the Candidates going into the study (alpha = .86), which was used as a covariate in all of 
our analyses. To the extent that we observe any effects of our manipulations, they will be over 
and above how much subjects believed they knew about the candidates going into the 
experiment. 
All subjects were shown two political ads from the 2012 presidential campaign (one from 
Obama and one from Romney)— both ads were either positive or negative in tone. In order to 
manipulate ad tone, we selected actual ads used by the two candidates’ campaigns.8 Obama’s 
positive ad had an upbeat “morning in America” tone: “We are a nation of doers and dreamers; 
all we ask is that our hard work pays off,” with a pointed reference to tax policy and the 
                                                 
8Our experiment does not include a pure control group where subjects are exposed to no 
manipulations and only respond to the dependent variable questions. See the appendix for a 
discussion of this design decision.  
8We randomly manipulated whether Obama’s ad or Romney’s ad was shown first, which is 




statement “We believe you grow the economy from the middle out.” Obama’s negative ad 
attacked Romney and Ryan’s abortion and health policies toward women. Romney’s positive ad 
had Ann Romney talking about her husband’s character: “If you really want to know how a 
person will operate, look at how they lived their life.” His negative ad focused on the economy 
and growing unemployment: “Obama’s economy is just not getting better. Romney has a plan 
for more jobs and more take-home pay.”9 
In order to examine whether selective exposure, per se, influences polarization, we 
needed a design that would separate the effects of the ideological diversity of the available news 
sources from simple availability of more information, generally. In the mainstream news 
treatment condition, subjects could access articles of many different topics that had appeared on 
the web pages of four different mainstream news organizations: The Associated Press, CBS 
News, Reuters News Service, and USA Today. There were always three articles available about 
each candidate on each of the topics. This condition was designed to represent the options 
available to voters before the explosion of choice that came with the spread of cable television 
and then the Internet. Figure 5 in the Online Appendix shows how the basic article choice page 
appeared in the mainstream news condition,10 while Figure 6 in the Appendix illustrates one of 
                                                 
9 Selecting which ads to use, out of the dozens of positive and negative ads produced by the 
campaigns, created many challenges. We selected these ads based upon their: 1) appeal to a 
national rather than local or regional audience, 2) alignment with the campaigns’ current 
message focuses (as of mid-September 2012), and 3) relatively low TV exposure (as best we 
could determine at the time). This, we hope, exposed our subjects to messages that they might 
plausibly encounter during the point of the campaign they viewed them, but that they were 
unlikely to have actually seen yet. This created an imbalance in the ads (they spoke about 
different issues), at the expense of strengthening the external validity of the study by making the 
ads seem more appropriate to the current tenor of the campaigns. We assume that the campaigns 
had good reasons for creating these ads and, rather than attempt to match the ads (i.e. have them 
speak to the same issue), we allowed the campaigns themselves to influence the ads we included, 
allowing us to observe what effects real ads created in the public.  
10In Appendix Figure 5, articles about Obama are on the left, articles about Romney on the right. 
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the mainstream articles that was available in this media environment. Subjects were instructed to 
“look at as many of these articles as you find interesting.” 
In the diverse media treatment condition (meant to represent the modern ideologically 
diverse Internet era), stories were available from mainstream news sources (Associated Press or 
Reuters), conservative news sources (Fox News or the Wall Street Journal), and liberal news 
sources (MSNBC or the New York Times).11 Again, there were always three articles available 
about each candidate on each of the different topics. Thus, subjects in the two media 
environment treatment conditions had the same number of articles available, on the same topics, 
but two-thirds of the articles were drawn from different media sites. Figure 7 in the Appendix 
shows what the article choice page looked like in the diverse media condition, while Figure 8 
illustrates one of the conservative articles that was available in this media environment.  
Subjects in both of the treatment conditions were also exposed to two political ads, one 
after the 3rd article that had been examined, the second after the 6th article. Because we needed to 
show subjects in the media environment treatment conditions two political ads, which we wanted 
to intersperse among the articles they chose to examine, the design of the study essentially 
required all subjects in the treatment conditions to open at least seven articles before a button 
appeared that allowed them to answer questions and complete the study. There was no limit on 
how much time subjects could spend with the study, and subjects had complete discretion over 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Side” (that is, which candidate was listed first) was another random manipulation that we again 
treat as a nuisance factor and ignore in the analysis. 
11 As a manipulation check, we conducted a preliminary study in which all articles were rated on 
a scale of ideological extremity. As we hoped, the articles available from the two liberal media 
outlets (mean rating 2.5) were indeed judged to have a significant pro-Obama/Democratic/liberal 
bias compared to articles from the four mainstream sources (mean of 2.9), while the articles 
selected from the two conservative sources (mean of 3.6) were judged to have a greater 
pro-Romney/Republican/conservative bias compared to the mainstream articles. Details about 




what articles to open, within the menu of options available to them, and what order to open them. 
We employed Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE) software (Lau and Redlawsk 
2006),12 which allowed us to track what articles subjects chose to examine in the two treatment 
conditions, in what order they accessed them, and how deeply they processed those articles.  
Following completion of the assigned campaign environment condition, subjects 
answered a series of questions about what they had learned about the two candidates during the 
experiment. Finally, subjects rated Barack Obama and Mitt Romney on feeling thermometer 
scales, and reported whether they intended to vote in the upcoming presidential election, and if 
so, the direction and strength of their choice.  
Given this design, if polarization is greater in the two media environment treatment 
conditions than in the control condition, it is the easy access to additional information, rather 
than the diversity of media sources, that is the primary causal factor. But if polarization is more 
or less equal in the control and mainstream news conditions, but less than in the diverse media 




Discretionary Information Search 
We begin our analysis by considering the total number of articles examined by subjects in 
our two Media Environment treatment conditions. Subjects opened between 3 and 44 distinct 
articles during the study, with a mean just under 9 (8.99). However, we exclude 6 subjects at the 
                                                 
12To learn more about this program, which is freely available to researchers, go to 
www.processtracing.org. An in-depth discussion of DPTE is available in the Online Appendix 
for this article. 
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tails of this distribution as outliers during our analysis.13 Doing so has little substantive impact 
on our results, but does reduce our standard errors, making our results more clear. This reduces 
the average number of items looked at slightly, to 8.64.  
As seen in Table 1, there is a hint of a Media Environment effect in the data, F(1,207) = 
3.76, p<.054 as well as of Ad Tone, F(1,207) = 3.56, p < .061, although neither crosses the 
conventional .05 threshold for significance. There is a significant Media Environment by Ad 
Tone interaction, F(1,207) = 5.86, p < .02, however, with the greatest search, as expected, in the 
Diverse Media, Negative Ads condition. The most complete story is told by a significant 3-way 
interaction between Candidate Preference, Media Environment, and Ad Tone, F(1,207) = 17.64,  
p < .001. The means are shown in Figure 2.  
 ***** Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here ***** 
Subjects in the Mainstream condition looked at approximately the same overall number 
of items, regardless of their candidate preferences or the tone of the ads they viewed. Likely 
Obama voters looked at roughly one more article, on average, in the diverse media, negative ads 
condition, compared to the diverse media, positive ads condition, but these differences are 
relatively small. Likely Romney voters, on the other hand, looked at nearly 6 additional items in 
the diverse media negative ad condition, compared to the diverse media positive ad condition. 
These latter differences are dramatic, and they accord with our a priori expectations. It is 
                                                 
13 Our rationale for excluding these cases is methodological, to ensure that we are looking at 
subjects who are participating in the study and acting within the bounds of normal behavior. 
Subjects were required to view 7 items before they could complete the information search 
process, but could get around this restriction by, for example, viewing the same article multiple  
times. We determined that subjects who viewed any item more than twice were most likely not 
seeking to truly learn information and but were instead simply speeding through the study rather 
than truly participating. Looking at the time subjects spent viewing items a second time, which is 
minimal, also supports this decision. Likewise, we exclude a few subjects who viewed several 
standard deviations more items than everyone else as outliers who were not behaving within the 
bounds of “normal” subject behavior. 
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primarily Republicans, in this modern high-choice, diverse media environment, whose 
information gathering is conditioned by the tone of the political advertising they see.14  
Selective Exposure 
 
But what type of articles were our subjects choosing to examine? As seen in Figures 8 
and 10 in the Online Appendix, they had many different options from which to choose (112, in 
fact). Our subjects could have been the ideal citizens of democratic theory, seeking out balanced 
information about both candidates to try to make some rational decision. But our experiment was 
in the field pretty late in the campaign, and most of our subjects already had a very good idea 
how they were going to vote. More realistically, then, we would expect motivated reasoners to 
engage in selective exposure, to look at more articles about their preferred candidate than about 
his opponent to try to avoid cognitive dissonance, and to help justify their choice to themselves 
or their social networks. 
We define selective exposure as the difference between the number of articles examined 
about the preferred candidate minus the number of articles examined about his opponent. 
Positive numbers reflect motivated reasoning, seeking out more information about the preferred 
candidate, negative numbers reflect just the opposite, while values close to 0 would reflect 
balanced search. The observed range of the variable is from -8 to +17, but its mean is -.17: that 
is, essentially 0. So overall, our subjects did not in general engage in selective exposure. 
But once again, we are particularly interested in whether our experimental manipulations 
had any effect on selective exposure. The ANOVA results are shown in Table 2, with the means 
                                                 
14We ran this same analysis on a dependent variable measuring “depth of processing,” calculated 
as the amount of time spent reading a particular information item/the total number of words in 
that item. Results were somewhat weaker, though essentially the same. See the Appendix for 




displayed in Figure 3. And once again we see a now familiar pattern of results. It is likely 
Republican voters, in the diverse media, negative ads condition, who stand out from everyone 
else by engaging in considerable selective exposure. Voters in every other condition of our 
experiment engaged in relatively balanced search, on average. But likely Romney voters, given 
the opportunities provided by a modern ideologically diverse “Viewer’s Choice” media 
environment, and the motivation from exposure to negative ads, take advantage of that situation 
by reading a lot more stories about their own candidate. They seem particularly determined to 
avoid the cognitive dissonance that might come from exposure to information that would 
challenge their candidate preference. 
 ***** Insert Table 2 and Figure 3 about here ****** 
Affective Polarization 
We collected two measures of affective polarization at the end of our first wave of data 
collection, 100-point feeling thermometer evaluations of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, 
where polarization is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the ratings of the 
two presidential candidates; and strength of vote choice preference, where polarization is 
reflected in a strong (vs. not so strong) candidate preference. 
Note that all of our subjects had already lived through a pretty long (and polarizing?) real 
world election campaign before they began our experiment. Druckman and Leeper (2012) talk 
about “pretreatment effects” in experimental research, and this is exactly what we have here. We 
were not sure if our experimental manipulations, consisting of nothing more than what subjects 
could have been exposed to or chosen to learn about the candidates themselves, and delivered 
late in the campaign, would have enough juice, enough punch, to increase polarization any more 
than the actual presidential campaign already had. Thus the timing of this experiment provides a 
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very conservative test of our hypotheses. 
Table 3 reports the ANOVA results for the feeling thermometer measure from the full 
model (which includes the “no article search” control condition). First, we should note that the 
amount of affective polarization in our data is quite large. The mean across all conditions is just 
over 56, slightly larger than the mean of 48 in the 2012 ANES survey. Candidate preference had 
absolutely nothing to do with this large difference. Likely Democratic and Republican voters 
both liked their own candidate, and disliked his opponent, a lot. The only significant difference 
in the ANOVA is the Media Environment by Ad Tone interaction, and its effect is dramatic. As 
shown in Figure 4, in the control condition, where subjects saw only the two political ads, or the 
mainstream news condition, where subjects could examine articles only from the web pages of 
mainstream news outlets, affective polarization was about seven and three points greater in the 
positive ad condition compared to the negative condition, respectively. It appears that most 
voters in these conditions largely rejected the attacks from either candidate in the negative ad 
conditions.  
But in the diverse media condition, where subjects had the ability to easily check out the 
claims made in the attack ads, and the leeway to shape the answer they got, polarization was 
noticeably greater in the negative ad condition compared to the positive ad condition—about 15 
points greater. The average polarization score in the Diverse, Negative Ad condition is the 
highest seen in this study, 67.6, while the average score in the Diverse, Positive Ad condition is 
the lowest, 52.7. Thus, we conclude that it is not just the diversity of media outlets, but the 
interaction between that diversity and the tone of campaign ads, that affects polarization. It is 
exposure to negative advertising combined with the diversity of media sources available, and not 




 ***** Insert Table 3 and Figure 4 about here *****  
This basic pattern of results is replicated if we switch dependent variables to strength of 
(pre-election) vote preference, which like the feeling thermometer variable, displays a high 
degree of polarization. Of those who reported a candidate preference, a full 80 percent said their 
preference was “Strong,” while only 20 percent said it was “Not Strong.” We regressed Strength 
of Vote Choice Preference on dummy variables representing the various experimental 
manipulations, and again found a highly significant diverse media by negative ad interaction (p < 
.008). As shown in Table 4, even controlling for strength of party identification, the strongest 
predictor of strength of vote preference we could think of, we still see a very significant diverse 
media by negative ad interaction. Even very late in the 2012 presidential campaign, our Media 
Environment and Ad Tone manipulations are having their theoretically predicted effects. The 
model predicts that strong party identifiers in the diverse media, negative ads condition are a full 
seven percent more likely to have a strong vote preference, than strong party identifiers in the 
positive ads control condition. 
 ***** Insert Table 4 about here *****  
 Discussion 
 
For the past several decades, observers of American politics have worried about a 
growing polarization of politics in the country, the lining up of partisans into two distinct camps 
who barely seem to coexist in the same world, who find compromise next to impossible, and 
who would rather see the other side lose than the country win. The evidence for polarization at 
the elite level is incontrovertible. While the public has clearly lagged behind elites in this matter, 
there is growing evidence from at least some indicators of polarization at the mass level as well.   
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Polarization, almost by definition, is a process that changes over time. If we want to help 
explain its growth, we must look for causes that have also changed over time. Our study provides 
strong evidence that the combination of the modern high-choice, ideologically diverse media 
environment, and exposure to negative political ads, can significantly increase affective 
polarization among the public. Our experiment manipulated the nature of the media environment 
to isolate its effect. Unfortunately, no one was studying information search 40 years ago during 
the Broadcast News era. But we experimentally recreated that era by providing subjects access 
only to articles from mainstream news sources in one of the conditions of our study. 
Fast-forwarding 30 or 40 years, the current high-choice, diverse media era was represented in our 
experiment by access to liberal and conservative news sources, along with mainstream ones. Any 
change in the degree of polarization over time is represented in our experiment primarily by the 
difference between these two treatment conditions. 
It is almost certainly the case that the proportion of political ads aired has grown more 
negative over the past 40 years (see for example Geer, 2006). There is incontrovertible evidence 
that the amount of political advertising has increased dramatically over time, however, and these 
two facts together make it clear that the probability that a voter would have been exposed to at 
least some negative advertising has increased over time. We found that exposure to negative 
rather than positive ads led to a 15 point increase in affective polarization in the diverse media 
condition, but had almost no effect whatsoever in the mainstream media condition. This 15 point 
effect we observed in our experiment is almost identical to the actual increase in affective 
polarization that occurred between 1996 and 2012, after the dramatic changes in the media 
environment that came about with the introduction of the Internet. Affective polarization may be, 
in effect, what the candidates are trying to achieve when they attack their opponents, but the 
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success of those efforts could have larger systemic implications for our government itself. Recent 
meta-analytic summaries of the negative campaigning literature have concluded that exposure to 
negative political ads is reliably associated with drops in both political efficacy and trust in 
government, two general political attitudes that could have long-term consequences for our 
system of government (Lau et al, 2007). We offer affective polarization as another unintentional 
but negative consequence of exposure to attack ads. 
As expected, we found strong partisan heterogeneity on information search and selective 
exposure in the responsiveness of Obama and Romney supporters to our experimental 
manipulations. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, it is primarily Romney supporters who react to 
exposure to negative political ads, in the context of our modern diverse media environment, by 
seeking out additional information, particularly information about their own candidate. This 
finding is consistent with evidence from Iyengar and Hahn (2009), who randomly assigned 
current news articles (falling into various “hard” and “soft” news categories) to 1 of 4 different 
news outlets (Fox News, NPR, CNN, or the BBC) and then asked online respondents which 
article they would want to read. Compared to selection rates among a control group shown the 
same stories but without any media labels, Democrats were significantly less likely to select Fox 
News articles, while by a much larger margin, Republicans were much more likely to want to 
read articles from Fox News. 
How can we explain these partisan differences? Although there is much discussion in the 
political psychology literature about the differential needs and values of liberals and 
conservatives (see Feldman, 2013, for a recent review), the most straightforward explanation is 
the role of elite cues. Since at least the time of Vice President Spiro Agnew, Republican political 
elites have complained about a liberal bias in the mainstream media. Eveland and Shah (2003) 
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report, with nationally representative survey data collected in 2000, that Republicans are 
particularly likely to perceive that the media is biased against their party’s candidates. The effect 
of party identification is by far the strongest in their data (see p. 114). Lee (2005) reports similar 
evidence from the 1996 ANES survey, that even controlling on political cynicism, conservative 
and Republican identification are both independently associated with distrust of the media. 
Suspected media bias, then, which conservatives and Republicans hear about regularly from 
party elites, would be a strong motivation for selective exposure among their faithful.  (See also 
Watts et al, 1999.) 
We also want to provide a few thoughts on the ecological validity of our experimental 
treatments. We were in the field studying a real election during the last month of the 2012 
presidential election campaign. We exposed all of our subjects to two actual ads from that 
campaign, and we clearly should not generalize from this treatment to the entire electorate. One 
of the least realistic aspects of most experiments on media effects is forced exposure to the 
manipulated message (Hovland, 1959), which most experimental subjects will pay more 
attention to than the average person would if somehow exposed to the same message outside of 
the lab, and our ad-tone manipulation is certainly open to that criticism.  
Everyone does not see political ads, even during a presidential election campaign. But 
most people do. And virtually everyone living in battleground states was exposed to many 
political ads which they did not actively choose to watch. We see no problem generalizing our 
results to residents of battleground states. We wish we had thought to ask our MTurk subjects 
what state they lived in, because if we had we could use living in a battleground state as an 
instrument for likely exposure to many political ads. We suspect that viewing two (additional) 
positive/negative ads in our experiment reminded subjects of the many prior positive/negative 
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Obama and Romney ads they had seen during the campaign, and how those ads made them feel. 
If we are right, then we would predict that our experiment would have had stronger effects on 
subjects actually living in battleground states. But this is mere speculation, and we have no way 
of testing it. 
Now, the first reaction people in real life have who see a political ad is probably not to go 
immediately to the Internet to check out its accuracy, as subjects in our experiment could. But 
that is because most of the time when people in real life are incidentally exposed to a political ad, 
they are doing something other than browsing the Internet. What our experiment did was to 
provide effortless access to something like the Internet, an easy opportunity to learn more about 
the candidates immediately after seeing one of their ads. We would argue that immediately going 
to the Internet after seeing a political ad was an artificial aspect of our study, one necessitated by 
the experimental method; but getting onto the Internet at some point not too long after seeing a 
political ad (or anything else, for that matter) is an everyday occurrence, given how often people 
use the Internet these days. And whenever you are on the Internet, you have the opportunity to 
visit the web pages of all of the news organizations from which we downloaded articles for this 
experiment. We would argue, then, that the ecological validity of our experiment was pretty 
high. And if the experiment occurring towards the end of a very intense political campaign 
means that we have conservative estimates of the effects of our manipulations, as we think is 
likely, then our findings are all the more impressive. 
This study is also important in that it provides strong evidence for the processes through 
which the increase in affective polarization may have come about. The combination of a diverse 
Viewer’s Choice media environment and exposure to negative ads led to significantly greater 
information search, deeper information processing, and selective exposure disproportionately 
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favoring subject=s preferred candidate B especially among likely Romney voters. It is important 
to reiterate that the observed affective polarization was not limited to Republicans, however, so 
our process data is only providing part of the explanation. But having any process data that can 
help explain an experimental finding is a big plus, and the dynamic process tracing experimental 
platform we utilized in this study is ideal for gathering that type of data. For all the talk about the 
dire consequences of selective exposure to one-sided information environments, there is little 
direct evidence for the phenomenon during an actual political campaign (as opposed to 
after-the-fact self-reports about media consumption). 
We want to close by stressing the importance of continuing to study information 
gathering as a vital link in virtually any type of attitude formation or decision making.  Political 
communications scholars have begun to think about how selectivity in media consumption alters 
how we have to study communications effects (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008; Geer et al, 2013; 
Gaines and Kuklinski, 2011). Arceneaux and Johnson (2013; Arceneaux, Johnson, and Murphy, 
2012) have conducted several clever experiments examining choice in watching cable television. 
Lau and Redlawsk (2006) envision voting as an information gathering process, much of which 
involves discretionary search, and have devised the DPTE platform as one method for studying 
how voters process information during political campaigns (see also Andersen, 2011; Ditonto, 
2013; Ditonto, Hamilton, and Redlawsk, 2013; Greco, 2014; Kleinberg, 2013, 2014; Pierce, 
2014). Valentino et al, 2009, and now we in this paper, are beginning to study information 
gathering from the Internet. We need these methods (and many more) before we will be able to 
make serious headway in understanding how the modern media environment impacts political 
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Effect of Media Environment, Ad Tone, and Candidate Preference 
on Information Search 
               Partial 
      Sum of    Mean     Eta 
 Source     Squares df Square        F    Sig.    Squared   
Media Environment (Diverse)   43.16 1  43.16   3.76    .054  .018 
Ad Tone (Negative)     40.81 1  40.81       3.56    .061 .017 
Candidate Preference (Romney)  6.33 1   6.33   0.55    .459  .003 
Media Env. X Ad Tone    67.23 1  67.23       5.86    .016  .028 
Media Env. X Cand. Pref.    21.69 1  21.69   1.89    .171  .009 
Ad Tone X Cand. Pref.    76.22 1  76.22   6.64    .011 .031 
Media Env. X Ad Tone X   202.54 1     202.54   17.64    .000  .079 
 Cand. Pref. 
Corrected (Full) Model   556.71 9  61.86   5.39    .000 .190 
Error          2376.30   207  11.48  
 
Note:  Analysis includes controls for subjective candidate knowledge coming into the 





Effect of Media Environment, Ad Tone, and Candidate Preference 
on Selective Exposure 
               Partial 
      Sum of    Mean     Eta 
 Source     Squares df Square          F       Sig.  Squared   
Media Environment (Diverse)   29.89 1   29.89        3.30    .071 .016 
Ad Tone (Negative)     20.41 1   20.41        2.26    .135 .011 
Candidate Preference (Romney) 165.87 1  165.87       18.33    .000 .081 
Media Env. X Ad Tone    18.56 1   18.56        2.05    .154 .010 
Media Env. X Cand. Pref.    20.83 1   20.83        2.30    .131 .011 
Ad Tone X Cand. Pref.    22.32 1   22.32        2.47    .118 .012 
Media Env. X Ad Tone X    39.93 1       39.93        4.41    .037 .021 
 Cand. Pref. 
Corrected (Full) Model   256.15    9   28,46   3.15     .001 .120 
Error          1873.40  207    9.05  
 
Note:  Analysis includes controls for subjective candidate knowledge coming into the 





Effect of Media Environment, Ad Tone, and Candidate Preference 
on Affective Polarization 
                Partial 
       Sum of     Mean     Eta 
 Source      Squares  df  Square          F      Sig.  Squared   
Media Environment      846.43 2   423.21    0.70    .497 .003 
Ad Tone (Negative)      242.99 1   242.99       0.40    .527 .001 
Candidate Preference (Romney)  695.60 1   695.60    1.15    .284 .003 
Media Env. X Ad Tone    6547.86 2  3273.93        5.41    .005 .024 
Media Env. X Cand. Pref.    1261.57 2   630.78    1.04    .353 .005 
Ad Tone X Cand. Pref.      22.80 1    22.80    0.04    .846 .000 
Media Env. X Ad Tone X     297.48 2       148.74    0.2     .782 .001 
 Cand. Pref. 
Corrected (Full) Model   42361.40  13  3258.57    5.39    .001 .137 
Error          267393.09 442   604.96  
 
Note:  Analysis includes controls for subjective candidate knowledge coming into the 








 Effect of Media Environment, Ad Tone, and Candidate Preference 
 on Strength of Vote Preference 
          B      S.E.  
Mainstream News Condition   .253     (.545) 
Diverse Media Condition   -.871     (.597) 
Ad Tone (Negative)   -.922*    (.416) 
Candidate Pref. (Romney)  -.382     (.309) 
Mainstream News X Ad Tone  .469     (.723) 
Diverse Media X Ad Tone    2.310**   (.874) 
Strength of Party ID   2.493***  (.505) 
Constant     .971     (.921)  
Omnibus Chi-Square  45.48***    (7 df) 
Nagelkerke R Square    .22  
 
       * p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p < .001           
 
Note:  Table entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.                            
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Validation Study: Creation of Experimental Stimuli 
 
Over the summer of 2012 we put several undergraduate interns to work finding brief 
articles about Obama=s and Romney=s Aposition@ on 23 different topics that we believed voters 
would like to know about the candidates. The interns were charged with finding at least five 
articles about each candidate on each topic: three from the web pages of purported mainstream 
news sources (the Associated Press, CBS News, Reuters News Service, and USA Today), one 
from either of two news organizations with liberal reputations (MSNBC or the New York Times), 
and one from either of two news sources with reputations for being conservative (Fox News or 
the Wall Street Journal).15 Three of the 23 topics had to be dropped because we could not find 
enough stories, but this left us with a total of 40 sets of articles (one about each of the two 
candidates, on 20 different topics), where each set contained articles from five different 
ideologically diverse news sources, for a total of 200 individual articles. 
To make sure that the articles our interns found on the web pages of these different news 
organizations comported with their reputations, we recruited a preliminary set of 261 subjects to 
read and evaluate the 40 sets of articles.16 To limit the amount of work that any rater would be 
asked to do, we divided these 40 sets of articles into five distinct groups, where each group 
                                                 
15We thank Isabella Briones, Michael Chernin, and Carolyn Lau for their invaluable help 
with different aspects of this project. 
16A little fewer than half (119) of these subjects were students from two of the authors= 
classes, who were doing the ratings as a class assignment. The remainder (142 people) were 
recruited from MTurk, and paid $2 for their time. Fifty-one percent of our subjects were male; 
66% were white, 7% black, 11% Asian, and 11% Hispanic. Fifty-nine percent were liberal, 22% 
moderate, and 19% conservative; 55% were Democrats, 16% Republican, and 2% independent. 
Thus our pool of raters had a noticeable liberal/Democratic bias. We make no claims about the 
absolute or objective level of bias in any of these articles, only that subjects could, when 
confronted with a set of articles about a particular topic, reliably detect that some of the articles 




included eight sets of articles (four about Obama, four about Romney) on different topics.   
Subjects were randomly assigned to read the 40 articles in one of these five groups. Subjects 
were asked to perform one simple task: Rate each article on a 5-point scale ranging from AStrong 
liberal/Democratic/Pro-Obama Slant@ to AStrong conservative/Republican/Pro-Romney Slant.@  
Because we wanted to emphasize comparative ratings, subjects were asked to read all five 
articles within a set first, and then rate each on the extent to which any of them were slanted in 
one direction or the other. The order of the articles was randomized within each set. When 
subjects in our main experiment select any of these articles to read, they will know its actual 
source. But that was not true of the raters in this preliminary study, who performed this task 
Ablind@ B that is, without knowing the source of any of the articles they were rating. Thus if we 
find differences across news organizations, it will be due to the actual content of the stories and 
not to the reputation of the news organization itself.  
The results of this preliminary study are shown in Figure 5, averaged across the ratings of 
all stories from each news source. As expected, stories from MSNBC and the NY Times were 
rated as having a significantly more liberal/Democratic/pro-Obama slant (M = 2.54, overall) than 
stories from the four mainstream news organizations (M = 2.90, t = 12.63), which in turn were 
perceived to be significantly more liberal than stories from Fox News and the Wall Street Journal 
(M = 3.56, t = 17.98). Of course, stories from the two liberal organizations were rated as 
significantly more liberal than stories from the two conservative news organizations (t = 
22.66).17 
                                                 
17Both our college students and our MTurk subjects had a noticeable liberal-Democratic 
bias in their own political preferences, and subject ideology does interact with the rating of the 
articles. There were no ideological difference in the ratings of the articles from the liberal news 
sources or the mainstream news sources, but very liberal subjects rated the articles from 
conservative news sources as more conservative than did subjects from the other ideological 
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***** Insert Figure 5 about here ***** 
    This is exactly what we were trying to create. The stories available to subjects in the diverse 
media condition are in fact more ideologically extreme (more liberal in some cases, more 
conservative in others) than the stories available in the mainstream news condition. It is not just 
the reputation of the news sources that varies between our mainstream news and diverse media 
conditions, but the actual news that they choose to report.18 
 
Additional Detail on Experiment Method 
 
 All volunteers for the experiment were directed to a web page where they would begin 
the study. After reading an online informed consent page, subjects in the ads-only control 
condition read: 
We have collected copies of several political ads that Obama and Romney are 
showing in different places around the country right now. The computer is going 
to randomly select one of these 30-second ads from each of the candidates to 
show you. We apologize if you have already seen either of these ads. 
 
Subjects in the two treatment conditions were instructed: 
We have gathered together a series of brief articles from a number of different 
media sources about each major candidate’s policy stands, their personal 
backgrounds, their families and so on -- the type of information that many people 
say they like to learn about the candidates before they make their vote decisions. 
[Diverse media condition only:  Some of these media sources are usually 
                                                                                                                                                             
groups. Controlling on ideology, however, we still see the hypothesize differences between the 
nature of the articles from the different news sources. 
18At the end of this preliminary study, after they had rated all of the individual articles, 
subjects were asked to rate what they believed was the ideological bias of each of the eight news 
organizations from which they articles in this study had been drawn. The ratings of the 
reputations of these eight news organizations closely mirrored the ratings of the actual bias in the 
stories selected from their web pages. 
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considered fairly liberal, others fairly conservative, and others pretty mainstream 
and balanced. ] We are studying what information people would still like to learn 
about the candidates at this point in the campaign. 
 
In a few minutes you will have the opportunity to examine over 100 of these brief 
articles. All of the available information will be listed in a big table, and all you 
will have to do is insert a code number (listed in the table), click the "Next" 
button, and the selected article will appear for you to read. Click the "Close" 
button and you will be returned to this table to select another article to examine. 
 
All of the articles in our study were taken directly from these organization's web 
pages. (Sometimes the articles were quite long, in which case we just copied the 
first few paragraphs to keep all of the stories roughly the same length.) Please 
look at as many of these articles as you find interesting. 
 
Of course, people do not actively choose to learn everything they end up knowing 
about political candidates, as you are doing with these news articles in our study. 
The candidates do their best to expose you to their messages, whether or not you 
want to hear them. We have gotten copies of several political ads that each 
candidate is showing in different places around the country right now. The 
computer is going to randomly select one of these ads from one of the candidates 
to show you after you have examined your third article, and randomly selection an 
ad from the other candidate to show you after you have examined your sixth 
article. (We apologize if you have already seen either of these ads.) 
 
Figure 6 shows how the basic article choice page appeared in the mainstream news 
condition, while Figure 7 illustrates one of the mainstream articles that was available in this 
media environment.  Figure 8 shows what the article choice page looked like in the diverse 
media condition, while Figure 9 illustrates one of the conservative articles that was available in 
this media environment.  
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***** Insert Figures 6-9 about here ***** 
  
Our experiment does not include a “pure” control condition for several reasons. First, our 
resources were being pushed to the limit, and we did not want to lose the statistical power that 
would result from devoting a fifth of our subjects, say, to a control condition. We were also 
interested in how much subjects would think they had learned from the experiment, and we could 
think of no way to ask such a question of a pure control group. But most importantly, it was not 
clear what such a “no treatment” control group would represent in the context of our experiment. 
We were not running a perfectly controlled experiment where all subjects would come into the 
experiment without any prior knowledge of the candidates. Nor were subjects living in some sort 
of neutral or median media environment – they were all living in our modern high choice, 
diverse, partisan media environment. So any “no treatment” control group would actually 
represent the peculiarities of the 2012 campaign context – not particularly generalizable, and 
“closer” to some of our treatment conditions than others. 
 
Depth of Processing 
 
When you look at any news article, you can ignore it completely, scan if briefly, or read it 
carefully and think about the arguments included in the article. Just because likely Romney 
voters looked at more distinct articles in the Diverse Media, Negative Ads condition, this would 
not necessarily mean that they should learn more from those articles if they somehow 
compensated for looking at more articles, by looking at them for less time. To make inferences 
about effort to learn, we need some measure of depth of processing. In cognitive psychology, a 
simple indicator of processing depth is how much time a subject spends reading some stimulus 
(see Carver, 1990; Craik and Lockhart, 1972; or Kintsch, 1999, for much more thorough 
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discussions). With written material you must control word length, of course, and if possible, for 
individual differences in reading speed. We estimated normal reading speed by how quickly 
subjects read several introductory and instructional screens that appeared during the course of the 
experiment. Reading speed is typically measured in words per minute, and it is standard to take 
the natural log of this ratio to minimize the weight of very slow reading times (which can often 
reflect flagging attention as much as slow reading). Controlling on the number of words in any 
article, depth of processing is then defined as how much slower or faster than their normal 
reading speed it took a subject to read any given news article. Positive numbers mean a subject 
spent more time (per word) reading the articles selected about the candidates than they did 
reading the instructions B that is, they processed the articles more carefully. Negative numbers 
would mean just the opposite.    
Averaged across all subjects and all articles, the mean depth of processing controlling on 
reading speed was .53.19 We primarily want to see if our manipulations affected processing 
depth. The ANOVA results are shown in Table 5, and the means displayed in Figure 10. 
Although the results for Depth of Processing are not quite as strong statistically as they are for 
information search, the pattern of results is essentially the same. Not only do likely Romney 
voters look at significantly more articles in the diverse media negative ads condition, but they 
also process those articles more deeply. We can therefore expect that they will learn more from 
those articles as well. 
 ***** Insert Table 5 and Figure 10 about here ****** 
                                                 
19The range was -1.47 to +2.50. It is hard to get an intuitive feel for exactly what this 
number means. The best we can do is to say that because it is positive, it means that on average 
subjects spent more time (controlling on number of words) reading the news articles than they 
did the various instructional screens. If we look at the raw numbers before taking logs, subjects 
on average read the articles about 70 percent more slowly than they read the instructions. 
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Perceived Learning about the Candidates  
The point of any political campaign is for citizens to learn enough about the competing 
parties or candidates that they can cast reasonably informed votes. Some of that learning is 
discretionary, and therefore under the person=s control. Citizens actively choose to listen to 
speeches, watch political debates, and read newspaper or Internet articles about the issues and 
competing candidates in an election in order to learn about them. Our experiment gave subjects 
in our two media treatment conditions the opportunity to learn something about Obama and 
Romney shortly before the 2012 election. But some of the learning about the candidates and 
issues in an election is incidental, accidental, obtained while you were doing something else, 
such as watching your favorite show on television. Candidates try their best to expose even 
reluctant, uninterested citizens to their campaign messages in the guise of political ads that often 
flood the airways in the months and weeks before an election. 
Our analysis so far has been limited to subjects randomly assigned to the two media 
environment treatment conditions who could choose to learn more about Obama and/or Romney 
from a large menu of options. But half of our subjects were in a no discretionary choice control 
condition and only watched the two (positive or negative) political ads. We expand the analysis 
now to include these control subjects. After completing the campaign learning portion of the 
experiment (i.e., viewing the two political ads, and examining whichever web articles they 
desired), subjects were asked how much they thought they had learned about Barack Obama and 
Mitt Romney (order randomized) during the study. While we did not have the experimental time 
available to ask the comprehensive set of objective questions that would have been required to 
measure actual learning from our experiment (given the large variety of articles subjects could 
have chosen to examine), we combined answers to these last two questions into a scale of 
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Perceived Candidate Learning (alpha = .83).   
The ANOVA results from analyzing this summary scale are shown in Table 6. There are 
only two main effects in these data. Likely Obama voters said they thought they had learned a 
little more from the experiment than likely Romney voters; and the (now three) Media 
Environment conditions differed significantly from each other. Figure 11 displays these latter 
results. The least amount of perceived learning occurred in the no discretionary learning control 
condition, comparted to the two treatment conditions where, in addition to the two political ads, 
subjects had the opportunity to read short media articles about Obama and Romney. This makes 
perfect sense. A planned comparison revealed that perceived learning in the control condition 
was significantly lower than the other two cells. But there was no effect whatsoever of Ad Tone 
on perceived learning, nor any interaction between any of our variables. 
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Appendix Table 5 
Effect of Media Environment, Ad Tone, and Candidate Preference 
on Depth of Processing 
 
    Sum of    Mean     
 Source   Squares df Square       F   Sig.    
Media Environment (Diverse)    1.39 1   1.39  3.01  .084 
Ad Tone (Negative)      1.04 1   1.04     2.20  .140 
Candidate Preference (Romney)  0.00 1   0.00   .00  .999 
Media Env. X Ad Tone      .11 1    .11        .24  .626 
Media Env. X Cand. Pref.      .82 1    .82  1.78  .184 
Ad Tone X Cand. Pref.     1.58 1   1.58   3.43  .066 
Media Env. X Ad Tone X     1.24 1       1.24  2.68  .103 
 Cand. Pref. 
Error            97.37  211    .46  
 
Note:  Analysis includes controls for subjective candidate knowledge coming into the 





Appendix Table 6 
Effect of Media Environment, Ad Tone, and Candidate Preference 
on Perceived Learning 
 
    Sum of    Mean     
 Source   Squares df Square           F   Sig.    
Media Environment (Diverse)  16.29 2   8.15      13.48  .000 
Ad Tone (Negative)      .04 1    .04        .06  .809 
Candidate Preference (Romney) 3.35 1   3.35      5.54  .019 
Media Env. X Ad Tone    1.01 2    .51           .84  .433 
Media Env. X Cand. Pref.     .95 2    .48      .79  .456 
Ad Tone X Cand. Pref.     .05 1    .05      .08  .782 
Media Env. X Ad Tone X    1.89 2        .95     1.57  .210 
 Cand. Pref. 
Error          272.60    451    .60  
 
Note:  Analysis includes controls for subjective candidate knowledge coming into the 




Appendix Figure 5 


























Appendix Figure 6 
Article Selection Screen, Mainstream News Condition 
 
 
You may select anything you wish to learn about either of the candidates 
by   entering the number of the article you wish to examine. After you have 
finished reading an article, click the "Next" button and you will be 
returned to this screen. 
                         Obama News Sources         Romney News Sources 
                         USA                    
 USA 
         AP   CBS  Reuters Today     AP   CBS  Reuters 
Today  
Economic Stimulus    OA12  OC12   OR12         |  RA12  RC12   RR12   
Gov't Spending      OA13  OC13   OR13         |  RA13  RC13   RR13   
Health Insurance      OA14  OC14   OR14         |  RA14  RC14   RR14   
Taxes        OA15  OC15   OR15         |  RA15  RC15   RR15   
Abortion        OC21   OR21  OU21  |  RA21  RC21   RR21   
Education Policy     OA22  OC22   OR22         |  RA22  RC22   RR22     
Gay Rights        OC23   OR23  OU23  |         RC23   RR23   
RU23 
Gun Control       OC24   OR24  OU24  |         RC24   RR24   
RU24 
Women's Rights       OC25   OR25  OU25  |         RC25   RR25   
RU25 
Defense Spending       OC31   OR31   OU31 |         RC31   RR31   
RU31 
Environment       OC32   OR32   OU32 |  RA32  RC32   RR32   
Immigration      OA33  OC33   OR33         |  RA33  RC33   RR33   
Military Intervention      OC34   OR34   OU34  |  RA34  RC34   RR34 
Terrorism        OC35   OR35   OU35  |  RA35          RR35   
RU35 
Family   OA42 OC42          OU42  |  RA42 RC42            
RU42 
Personality        OC43   OR43  OU43  |        RC43    RR43   
RU43 
Personal Wealth        OC44   OR44  OU44  |        RC44    RR44   
RU44 
Political Philosophy OA45 OC45   OR45         |  RA45 RC45    RR45 
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Appendix Figure 8 
Article Selection Screen, Diverse Media Condition 
 
 
You may select anything you wish to learn about either of the candidates by   entering the 
number of the article you wish to examine. After you have finished reading an article, click the 
"Next" button and you will be returned to this screen. 
 
End9 - I have learned as much as I want; I would like to answer the  
       remaining questions and complete the study now. 
 
                              Romney News Sources         Obama News Sources 
                       Liberal  Mainstrm   Conserv.    |Liberal   Mainstrm Conserv. 
Economic Stimulus  RL12    RM12     RN12   |    OL12    OM12   ON12 
Gov't Spending  RL13    RM13     RN13   |    OL13    OM13   ON13 
Health Insurance  RL14    RM14     RN14   |    OL14    OM14   ON14 
Taxes    RL15    RM15     RN15   |    OL15    OM15   ON15 
Abortion   RL21    RM21     RN21   |    OL21    OM21   ON21 
Education Policy  RL22    RM22     RN22   |    OL22    OM22   ON22 
Gay Rights   RL23    RM23     RN23   |    OL23    OM23   ON23 
Gun Control   RL24    RM24     RN24   |    OL24    OM24   ON24 
Women's Rights  RL25    RM25     RN25   |    OL25    OM25   ON25 
Defense Spending  RL31    RM31     RN31   |    OL31    OM31   ON31 
Environment   RL32    RM32     RN32   |    OL32    OM32   ON32 
Immigration   RL33    RM33     RN33   |    OL33    OM33   ON33 
Military Intervention  RL34    RM34     RN34   |    OL34    OM34   ON34 
Terrorism   RL35    RM35     RN35   |    OL35    OM35   ON35 
Family    RL42    RM42     RN42   |    OL42    OM42   ON42 
Personality   RL43    RM43     RN43   |    OL43    OM43   ON43 
Personal Wealth  RL44    RM44     RN44   |    OL44    OM44   ON44 
Political Philosophy  RL45    RM45     RN45   |    OL45    OM45   ON45 
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Appendix Figure 10 
Effect of Candidate Preference, Media Environment and Ad Tone  


















Appendix Figure 11 
Effect of Media Environment on Perceived Learning 
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